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Human-Computer Negotiation in Three-Player Market
Settings
Galit Haim 1 and Ya’akov (Kobi) Gal 2 and Sarit Kraus 3 and Bo An 4
Abstract. This paper studies commitment strategies in three-player
negotiation settings comprising human players and computer agents.
We deﬁned a new game called the Contract Game which is analo-
gous to real-world market settings in which participants need to reach
agreement over contracts in order to succeed. The game comprises
three players, two service providers and one customer. The service
providers compete to make repeated contract offers to the customer
consisting of resource exchanges in the game. We formally analyzed
the game and deﬁned sub-game perfect equilibrium strategies for the
customer and service providers that involve commitments. We con-
ducted extensive empirical studies of these strategies in three differ-
ent countries, the U.S., Israel and China. We ran several conﬁgura-
tions in which two human participants played a single agent using
the equilibrium strategies in various role conﬁgurations in the game
(both customer and service providers). Our results showed that the
computer agent using equilibrium strategies for the customer role
was able to outperform people playing the same role in all three
countries. In contrast, the computer agent playing the role of the ser-
vice provider was not able to outperform people. Analysis reveals
this difference in performance is due to the contracts proposed in
equilibrium being signiﬁcantly beneﬁcial to the customer players, as
well as irrational behavior taken by human customer players in the
game.
1 Introduction
Many negotiations between consumers and suppliers in the real-
world include binding commitments. Examples abound and include
cell-phone and credit card plans, as well as publishing and retail.
Commitments often have detrimental effects for producers and con-
sumers alike. It is often the case that consumers ﬁnd themselves
locked into long-term commitments to existing contracts that pre-
vent them from switching providers and possibly paying less for the
same services. Such long-term commitments also reduce the amount
of competition in the market and companies have less motivation to
improve their products and services, further decreasing the efﬁciency
and quality of the market. On the other hand, removing commitments
altogether may encourage consumers to switch between providers at
high rates and burdening suppliers with recurring installation and de-
activation costs.
This paper studies these aspects in a controlled experiment involv-
ing human players and computer agents playing equilibrium strate-
gies. We deﬁned a new game called the Contract Game which is
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analogous to a market setting in which participants need to reach
agreement and commit or renege from contracts over time in order
to succeed. The game comprises three players, two service providers
and one customer. The service providers compete to make repeated
contract offers to the customer consisting of resource exchanges in
the game. The customer can join and leave contracts at will.
We formally deﬁne the notion of commitment between service
providers and customers in the game and provide Sub-game Nash
equilibrium strategies for each of the players. Speciﬁcally, because
service providers compete over the customer player, the contracts
proposed by both service providers and customers are highly bene-
ﬁcial contracts to the customer, but require a commitment from the
customer that would prevent it from signing a contract with the other
service provider. In addition, the customer player will agree to any
contract proposal that provides it with positive beneﬁt, while the ser-
vice provider will not accept a contract proposal that will not include
a commitment from the customer player. These off-the-equilibrium
path strategies are shown to be especially relevant to human play in
the game which does not adhere to equilibrium strategies. We hy-
pothesized that the focus on commitments in the game will make the
equilibrium agents adapt well to play with people in the game.
To evaluate computer agents that use the equilibrium strategies,
we conducted extensive empirical studies in three different coun-
tries, the U.S., Israel and China. We ran several conﬁgurations in
which two human participants played a single agent participant in
various role conﬁgurations in the game. Our results showed that the
computer agent using Nash equilibrium strategies for the customer
role was able to outperform people playing the same role in all three
countries. In particular, the customer agent made signiﬁcantly more
commitment type proposals than people, and requested signiﬁcantly
more chips from service providers than did people. Also, the cus-
tomer agent was able to reach the goal signiﬁcantly more often than
people. Lastly, in China, people were able to outperform the ser-
vice provider agent, while in Israel the performance of the service
provider agent was similar to that of people. These results suggest
that customers making commitment proposals in the face of com-
petition from provers can succeed well when the providers follow
equilibrium strategies.
Our paper relates to works studying negotiation and bargaining be-
havior in economics and artiﬁcial intelligence. There are few works
that study negotiations in groups comprising more than two par-
ticipants human-computer settings. Ficici and Pfeffer used machine
learning to model the belief hierarchies that people use when they
make decisions in one-shot interaction scenarios [4, 3]. Van Wissen
at el. [10] studied team formation in human-computer teams in which
players negotiated over contracts. None of these works considered an
agent-design for repeated negotiation with people. Hoz-Weiss and
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Kraus’s prior work has addressed some of the computational chal-
lenges arising in repeated negotiation between people and computer
agents [7]. Azaria et al. [1], studied negotiation over completing a
set of tasks in a crowed-sourcing environment. They implemented an
agent which negotiated with people from the USA and from India.
Lastly, Peled et al. [8] used equilibrium agents to play with people
in a two-round negotiation setting of incomplete information. These
agents were outperfomed by agents using machine learning methods
that predicted how people reveal their goals during negotiation.
The key contribution of this paper is a ﬁrst study of negotiation
over contracts in three-player market games involving human and
computer players in different countries.
A few works have studied negotiation behavior among more than
two agents in settings comprising solely computational players. An et
al. [2] formalised how uncertainty over deadlines and reserve prices
can affect equilibrium strategies in one-to-many and many-to-many
negotiation scenarios in which agents follow alternating-offers bar-
gaining protocols and there is a discount factor. Sandholm and Zhou
studied equilibrium in negotiation in which agents could opt out of a
commitment by a penalty fee [9]. Kalandrakis [6] studied bargaining
behavior among three players and formalized a Markov perfect Nash
equilibrium that depends on the state of the world using a dynamic
game formalism.
2 Implementation: Colored Trails
Our three-player market setting was conﬁgured using the Colored
Trails (CT) game [5]. It consists of a game that interleaves negotia-
tion to reach agreements and decisions of whether to accept or reject
an agreement, to whom to propose a proposal, and the movement
strategy.
2.1 The Contract Game
There are 3 players, one is the customer (CS) player and two players
are the service providers (SPy and SPg) players. The CS player
moves on a board of color squares m × n grid. Figure 1 shows a
snapshot of the game from the perspective of a CS player (the “me”
player). In this game the SPg player is designated as the square icons
located at the far-left corner of the ﬁrst row, and the SPy player is
designated as the oval goal icon on the far-right corner of the ﬁrst
row. These two squares on the board were designated as the goal
squares. The board also shows the location of the CS player icon on
the last line of the board in the middle column, nine steps away from
each goal square.
At the beginning of the game, each player has a set of colored
chips, in which the amount and the colors of the chips may dif-
fer from one player to another. The game is divided into several
rounds. Each round entails a negotiation between the customer and
the providers, a movement of the customer on the board. In the ne-
gotiation phase, the SP players or the CS can act as a “Proposer” or
as a “Responder”. The players switch their roles, such that the ﬁrst
proposer in the previous negotiation phase was designated as a re-
sponder in the next negotiation phase, and vice versa. When the CS
is the proposer, it can send a proposal to only ONE of the Providers.
When the CS is the responder, the providers may send him a pro-
posal simultaneously in this phase, but they cannot see each other’s
proposals. Once the CS receives a proposal, he may accept or reject
the proposal, but he can accept only one such proposal in each round.
Once the responder accepts a proposal, the chips are automatically
exchanged between the proposer and the responder of the proposal.
Figure 1. Snapshot of the Contract Game with an outlined preferred path
At the end of the negotiation phase, there is a movement phase,
which is analogous to the customer performing individual tasks
which take up resources. In the movement phase, only the CS can
move. The CS can choose where to move according to the chips he
has, and can move any number of squares (up, right or left but not
diagonally) according to the chips in its possession.
2.2 Game Termination and Scoring
The phases described above repeat until the game terminates, which
occurs when one of the following conditions holds. (1) The CS does
not move for two consecutive rounds; (2) The CS reaches one of the
goal-squares belonging to one of the providers. The players’ scores
are computed at an intermediate or terminal point in the game as
follows: (1) 150 Points to both the customer and the provider whose
goal-square was reached by the customer, if any, and (2) 5 bonus
points for any chip left in a player’s possession. For example, at the
beginning of the game, as shown in Figure 1, the CS player has 24
chips and his score is 125, whereas the SPs has 40 chips each and
their initial score is 200 each. The object of the game for the CS is
to reach the goal of one of the providers, and to try to use as few
chips as possible in order to end the game with a large amount of
chips. In this game, there is full information about the board and
chips, but both providers repeatedly compete to make contracts with
the customer player. The score of each player does not depend on the
scores of any of the other players.
2.3 General Formalization
We provide a formalization of the board game as follows using
parameters where necessary: A state s of the game is a tuple:
〈CCS , Cy, Cg, (x, z), r〉 where CCS is the set of chips of the cus-
tomer player, and Cy and Cg are the sets of chips of SPy and
SPg respectively, (x, z) is the location of CS on the board and r
is the round of the game. There are two goal locations on the board:
Gy = (xy, zy) and Gg = (xg, zg). An offer O is a pair (OCS , Oi)
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i ∈ {g, y} such that OCS ⊆ CCS is the set of chips that customer
will send to player SPi and Oi ⊆ Ci is the set of chips that player
SPi will send to the CS player.
The game ends in a terminal state s = 〈CCS , Cy, Cg, (x, z), r〉 in
which one of the following holds:
• the CS agent reached the SPy goal, i.e. (x, z) = (xy, zy),
• the CS agent reached the SPg goal, i.e., (x, z) = (xg, zg),
• the CS player has not moved for two consecutive rounds, i.e., in
the two states prior to s, the location of the CS was also (x, z).
A player’s performance in the game is measured by a scoring func-
tion. Each player obtains b points for each chip he has at the end of
the game. If the CS player reached one of the goals Gi then he and
the service provider SPi both receive a bonus b∗. In the speciﬁc
game that we played b was 5 and b∗ was 150 points. For a terminal
state s we denote by ui(s) the score of player i at s, i ∈ {CS, g, y}.
We extend ui to non terminal states to be b · |Ci|.
3 Equilibrium Strategies
In this section we provide an equilibrium analysis of the game. Be-
forehand we make the following deﬁnitions. Given a board in the
Contract Game, a location (x1, z1) is said to be near location (x2, z2)
if either x2 = x1 + 1, x2 = x1 − 1, z2 = z1 + 1 or z2 = z1 − 1.
A path P from (x1, z1) to (xk, zk) is a sequence of locations on the
board {(x1, z1), ..., (xl, zl), ..., (xk, zk)} such that (xl, zl) is near
(xl+1, zl+1) for any 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1. For example, in Figure 1, we
see a possible path outlined on the board from the current location of
the CS player to the SPg service provider.
The set of needed chips to go through a path P is denoted by CP .
A path P is possible in state s if CP ⊆ Ccs and (x1, z1) = (x, z).
Moving along a path, regardless to its length moves the game to the
next round. Let s = 〈Ccs, Cy, Cg, (x, z), r〉 be a state and
P = {(x, z), ..., (xl, zl), ..., (xk, zk)} is a possible path of s then
the result of CS moving according to P denoted Res(s, P ) is the
state s′ = 〈Ccs \ CP , Cy, Cg, (xk, zk), r + 1〉. In Figure 1, if the
CS moves on the outlined path, this will reduce from its chip set 9
grey chips.
A preferred path for the CS player at s from (x, z) to the one of
the goals Gi, denoted P ∗s is a possible path of state s to the goal Gi
such that for any other possible path P from (x, z) to one of goals
Gj , j ∈ {g, t} ucs(Res(s, P )) ≤ ucs(Res(s, P ∗s )). The CS has
many paths to move on in order to reach a goal-square, for example,
suppose the CS has also 3 purple chips. Then, one path is to go
directly to the goal-square using 9 chips, and another path is to use
12 chips, then the preferred path is the one that requires the least
number of chips. In the board game shown in the ﬁgure, the path that
is outlined is one of the preferred paths of the customer player.
We extend the Res function when an offer O = (Ocs, Oi)
is accepted in state s = 〈Ccs, Cy, Cg, (x, z), r〉. If i = y then
Res(s,O) = 〈Ccs ∪Oi \Ocs, Cy ∪Ocs \Oy, Cg, (x, z), r〉; sim-
ilarly if i = g. For example, suppose the CS has 120 points and the
SPy has 200 points. Now, the SPy proposes to send 33 red chips
and 7 purple chips for 11 grey chips, then after accepting the offer,
the resulting score of the CS is 265 and 55 for the SPy.
Recall that the CS player has the needed chips to reach both goals
at the beginning of the game. Furthermore, all the paths from the
location of the CS at the beginning of the game toGi, i ∈ {g, y} re-
quire speciﬁc chips that are not required to reachGj , i ∈ {g, y}, i =
j. As can be seen in Figure 1, the CS has all the needed chips to
reach both goals. To reach the SPy goal square the CS needs to
use 9 yellow chips, while to reach the SPg goal square the CS
needs to use 9 grey chips. The service provider players do not have
these speciﬁc chips that are needed to reach the goals. Formally,
let s1 = 〈Ccs, Cy, Cg, (x1, z1), 1〉 be the initial state of the game.
There are a set of chips CGy and CGg , CGg ∪CGy ⊆ Ccs such that
for any possible path Pi from (x1, z1) to Gi ∈ {g, y} CGi ⊆ Pi
and for any possible path Pj from (x1, z1) to Gj , j ∈ {g, y}, i = j,
CGi ⊆ Pj .
3.1 Commitments
The offers that play an important role in the equilibrium are called
commitment offers and are deﬁned as follows: We say the CS
player is committed to player SPi, i ∈ {g, y} in state s =
〈Ccs, Cy, Cg, (x, z), r〉 if for any path P from (x, z) to Gj , j ∈
{g, y}, j = i, CP ⊆ (Ccs ∪ Cj). That is, if the CS player is com-
mitted to player SPi, even if the CS player will get all the chips
from SPj, he will still not be able to reach its goal. Thus, to get the
bonus, he will need to reach the goal of SPi.
An offer O = (Ocs, Oi) made at state s is a commitment offer
toward SPi if in s the CS player is not committed toward any of
the SP players and the resulting state the CS player is committed to
SPi. That is, the CS player is committed to SPi in Res(s,O).
As an example, a commitment offer at the beginning of the game
shown in Figure 1 is when the SPy proposes to send 33 red chips
and 7 purple chips for 11 grey chips.
A preferred commitment offer at state s for the CS player toward
SPi denoted Ois is a commitment offer such that
1. there is a possible path toward Gi at Res(s,Ois),
2. it holds that ui(Res(s,Ois)) + b∗ > ui(s),
3. for any other commitment offer O toward SPi that satisﬁes (1)
and (2), it holds that
ucs(Res(Res(s,O), P
∗
Res(s,O))) ≤
ucs(Res(Res(s,O
i
s), P
∗
Res(s,Ois)
))
(1)
Condition (3) refers to the score for the CS player score at the end
of the game. Once a commitment offer toward SPi is implemented,
we assume in the deﬁnition that the CS agent will move directly
to the goal (as will be specify in the equilibrium below). If so, it is
to his beneﬁt that he will move following the shortest path. Since,
Res(s,Ois) is the state after implementing the preferred commit-
ment offer, the shortest path will be P ∗Res(s,Ois). As an example, the
commitment offer described above for the board game of Figure 1
is the preferred commitment of the CS player for the conditions at
the beginning of the game. We denote the set of all preferred com-
mitment offers toward SPi by Ois and set Os = Ogs ∪ Oys and
O∗s = argmaxO∈Os ucs(Res(Res(s,O), P
∗
Res(s,O))).
3.2 SubGame Perfect Equilibria
Before providing additional notations that will be used in the for-
mal deﬁnition of the sub-game perfect equilibrium strategies, we will
provide some intuition on these strategies. In equilibrium the CS
player would like to (1) follow the shortest path toward one of the
goal and thus obtain his bonus and keep as many chips as possible;
(2) it would like to negotiate with the service providers to make deals
that will give him as many chips as possible. Thus, even if SPi sends
him many chips, there is no guarantee that the CS player will go to
his goal. Furthermore, the CS player will keep asking for additional
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chips making the overall interaction non beneﬁcial to SPi. However,
once a commitment offer toward SPi is implemented the CS must
go to Gi in order to obtain his bonus and therefore commitment of-
fers are beneﬁcial.
Both service providers want to reach commitment offers and they
compete with each other. In particular, in the ﬁrst round both of them
send commitment offers to the CS. The CS will choose the one that
will yield him the highest ﬁnal score. So, both of them will send the
best offer to the CS that is better to the SP than his current score.
The CS will accept the highest one and will go directly to the rel-
evant goal. Thus, the game will end after one round. However, the
sub-game perfect equilibrium strategies will also specify the off the
equilibrium path choices. This is especially needed as the computer
players must be able to play with peope who may not adhere to equi-
librium strategies.
Next we will deﬁne beneﬁcial paths for theCS player. These paths
will be used in the equilibrium strategies speciﬁed bellow.
Deﬁnition 1 (Preferred Paths) If s is a commitment state toward
SPi, the preferred path for CS is P ∗s .
If s is not a commitment state then (i) if CS has moved in the
previous round then it should not move and the path is the empty
sequence. (ii) if the CS has not moved in the previous round then he
should move according to path argmax{ucs(Res(s,O∗Res(s,P ))) |
P is a possible path at s}.
We denote the preferred path at state s by P+s .
As an example, the path outlined in Figure 1 is preferred for the CS
player.
Next we deﬁne the values of offers and states if the players follow
the equilibrium speciﬁed below.
Deﬁnition 2 (Value of offers and states) Let s be a non committed
state, O is an offer and s′ = Res(Res(s,O), P+Res(s,O))
• If O is a non commitment offer at s then
v(O, s) = uCS(Res(Res(s
′, O∗s′), P
∗
Res(s′,O∗
s′ )
)).
• If O is a commitment offer at s then
v(O, s) = uCS(Res(s
′, P ∗s′)).
• v(s) = uCS(Res(Res(s,O∗s ), P ∗Res(si,O∗s ))).
If s is a commitment state then v(s) = uCS(Res(s, P ∗s )) and
v(O, s) = uCS(Res(s,O), P
∗
s ).
Theorem 1 The following strategies form a sub-game perfect equi-
librium for the contract game:
Given a state s = 〈Ccs, Cy, Cg, (x, z), r〉 the strategy for the SPi
is as follows:
1. If it is the negotiation stage of an even round and it received an
offer O then
(a) If (i) O is a commitment offer toward SPi and (ii) there
is a possible path toward Gi at Res(s,O), and (iii)
ui(Res(s,O)) + b
∗ ≥ ui(s) then accept the offer.
(b) Otherwise (if at least one of the conditions does not hold), if
ui(Res(s,O)) > ui(s), accept the offer.
(c) Otherwise, reject the offer.
2. If it is the negotiation stage of an odd round (the SP makes the
proposal)
(a) If Oi = ∅ then make the commitment preferred offer
argmaxO∈Oi(ui(Res(s,O)) + b
∗).
(b) Otherwise make the offer (∅, ∅).
Given a state s = 〈Ccs, Cy, Cg, (x, z), r〉 the strategy for the CS is
as follows:
1. If it is the negotiation stage of an odd round and it received the
offers Og and Oy then
(a) if maxOi∈{Og ,Oy} v(s,Oi) ≥ v(s) then accept
argmaxOi∈{Og ,Oy} v(s,Oi) and reject the other offer.
(b) Otherwise reject both offers.
2. If it is a negotiation stage of an even round (the CS makes the
proposal)
(a) if Os = ∅, v(O∗s , s) ≥ v(Res(s, P+s )) and O∗s ∈ Oi then
make the preferred commitment offer O∗s to SPi.
(b) Otherwise make the offer (∅, ∅) to SPi.
3. If it is a movement state then move according to P+s .
The proof of this Theorem is omted for brevety. We demonstrate
the equilibrium on the board game in Figure 1. In this game, the SPy
agent will propose 33 red chips and 7 purple chips and require 11
yellow chips. This proposal provides 265 points to theCS player and
205 points to the SP agent. This proposal is a preferred commitment
and will be accepted by the CS player.
4 Empirical Methodology
In this section we describe the evaluation of the equilibrium agents
for playing the contract game with human players. We recruited 398
students enrolled in undergraduate degree programs in three different
countries: Israel, U.S.A and China. These included 172 students from
two Israeli universities (average age of 25; female ratio of 35%), 115
students from the greater Boston area (average age of 22; female ratio
of 48%), and 111 students from China (average age of 23; female
ratio of 46%). Participants were given an identical 25-minute tutorial
on the 3-player market Game (in their native language) as well as a
5-minute quiz about the rules of the game.
We ran two types of conﬁgurations, one consisting of all human
players and the other consisting of two people and a computer agent
playing the service provider or customer role. Games consisting of
3-human players games were denoted as HvsH; the games consist-
ing of an agent playing the customer role (denoted as CSa) and two
human players were denoted as HvsCSa; the games consisting of an
agent playing the service provider role (denoted as SPa) and two
human players were denoted as HvsSPa. In the HvsSPa games, the
agent player played the role of the SP yellow player. The initial score
of each player is as follows: the CS player had 125 points; and each
one of the SP players had 200 points. All the following analysis and
results were statistically signiﬁcant in the p < 0.05 range using ap-
propriate t-tests and ANOVAs.
Table 1 shows the number of games played in each game type.
HvsH games HvsCSa games HvsSPa games
Israel 36 15 17
U.S.A 15 15 20
China 15 16 17
Table 1. Number of games played in each country
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Figure 2. Performance comparison of the CS player
4.1 Analysis of Results for the Customer Role
In this section we analyze results for HvsCSa games in which the
CSa agent used the equilibrium strategies to play the role of the
customer. We compare the performance of these agents to human
players in the respective customer role in the all-human HvsH games.
HvsH games HvsCSa games HvsSPa games
Israel 7.37 16.36 5.096
U.S.A 7.1 21.32 12.68
China 4.57 22.52 9.06
Table 2. CS Proposals competitiveness comparison
As shown in Figure 2, the CSa agent signiﬁcantly outperformed
the respective human player in the HvsH game-type. This result was
consistent in all three countries.
To understand the success of the CSa agent, recall that in equi-
librium, the commitment proposals made by the customer are highly
selﬁsh, in that it requests many chips from the designated service
provider. This is because of the inherent competition in the game be-
tween the two service providers. To demonstrate this, we deﬁne the
competitiveness measure of a proposal made by the customer to a ser-
vice provider to equal the difference between the number of chips re-
quested by the customer player and the number of chips provided by
the customer player. For example, suppose that theCSa agent player
proposes a commitment offer and asks for 40 red chips and proposes
to send 11 yellow chips. In this case its competitiveness measure will
be 29 chips. Table 2 shows the average competitiveness of the cus-
tomer player (both human and computer agent) in all games played
in the different countries. As shown in the table, the average competi-
tiveness of the CSa agent in HvsCSa games was signiﬁcantly higher
than the competitiveness of people in HvsH games and in HvsSPa
games.
Table 3 lists the ratio of games that ended after commitments were
made. After a commitment is made, the CSa player proceeds to-
wards the relevant SP player, and the game terminates. As shown
in the table, in HvsCSa games (middle column), there were signif-
icantly more games in which commitment proposals were accepted
than in HvsH games (left-most column).
Lastly, Figure 3 shows the percentage of games in which the cus-
tomer player reached the goal in each country. This ﬁgure also shows
that the CSa agent was signiﬁcantly more likely to reach one of the
Figure 3. Getting the goal in HvsH games versus HvsCSa games
Figure 4. Performance comparison of the SPa player
service providers than human beings. This result is striking, given
that the customer players have the necessary resources to reach the
goal at the onset of the game, showing that at times people playing
the customer role behave irrationally in the game.
HvsH games HvsCSa games HvsSPa games
Israel 13/36 (36.11%) 12/15 (80%) 3/15 (64.7%)
U.S.A 3/15 (20%) 10/15 (66.66%) 14/19 (73.68%)
China 5/15 (33.33%) 7/16 (43.75%) 14/17 (82.35%)
Table 3. Percentage of games ending with accepted commitments
4.2 Analysis of Results for Service Provider Role
In this section we evaluate the HvsH game-type versus the HvsSPa
type. Figure 4 shows the performance of the SPa human player
in the HvsH games versus SPa equilibrium agent in the HvsSPa
games. As we can see in this table, people were able to signiﬁcantly
outperform the SPa agent in China and in the U.S. In Israel, the
difference of the average score between the SPa human player was
not signiﬁcant. The reason for this performance is that according to
the equilibrium strategy described in Section 3, the SPa proposed
commitments that were highly generous to the customer player. In
particular, the SPa proposed all of its chips to the customer player
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Figure 5. Getting the goal in HvsH games versus HvsSPa games
as part of the commitment. As shown by Table 4, the average number
of chips that is offered by the SPa player to customers was signiﬁ-
cantly higher than people in all three countries. However, the reason
for its poor performance was not the generosity of the agent but rather
the way people behaved in the game. Interestingly, Table 3 shows
that the ratio of games that ended following commitments requested
by the SPa agent was signiﬁcantly lower (right-most column) than
commitments requested by the CSa player (middle column). This is
another example of irrational behaviour by people, in that they agree
to commitments but do not follow through by ending the game.
HvsH games HvsCSa games HvsSPa games
Israel 2.6 2.71 15.66
U.S.A 1.53 0.69 19.33
China 2.5 0.36 16.32
Table 4. SPa Proposals generosity comparison
4.3 Cultural Differences
We end this section with discussing cultural difference between peo-
ple’s behavior in China and the other two countries. First, as shown
in Figure 3, In China, people playing the customer role reached the
goal signiﬁcantly less often than in Israel and in the U.S.A. As a
result, Figure 2, they accrued signiﬁcantly less score than their re-
spective scores in Israel and the U.S. In addition, in the U.S.A, the
CS reached the goal much more than in China and Israel in both
HvsH and HvsSPa game types. Lastly, Figure 5 shows that in Is-
rael and in the US, there was no signiﬁcant difference between the
percentage of games in which people and SPa agents reached the
goal. In contrast, in China the percentage of players reaching the
goal in HvsSPa games was higher than in HvsH games. Speciﬁcally,
in China in the HvsSPa games, the CS reached the SPy goal-square
in 83% of games, versus 55% of games in the HvsH games. On the
other hand, the SPa average score in HvsH was much higher, 220,
than the SPa score, 179.23. Again, this is because of the fact that ac-
cording to the EQ model, the SPa proposed only commitment offers
which proposed many chips to send.
5 Conclusions
This paper studied the notion of commitment in three-player contract
games consisting of human and computer players. We deﬁned a new
game that comprises three players, two service providers and one
customer. The service providers compete to make repeated contract
offers to the customer consisting of resource exchanges in the game.
We evaluated computer agents that use the equilibrium strategies
in extensive empirical studies in three different countries, the U.S.A,
Israel and China. We ran several conﬁgurations in which two human
participants played against a single agent participant in various role
conﬁgurations in the game. Our results showed that the computer
agent using equilibrium strategies for the customer role was able to
outperform people playing the same role in all three countries. We
are currently developing a risk averse agent for this purpose that uses
learning and adaptation to improve the SPa performance.
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